

DRAFT

Don —

Approved For Release 2005/08/24 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001000030051-2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Services

STAT FROM:

Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: A Suggestion for Handling Certain Manuscripts
Written by Current and Former CIA Employees

1. The statistics over the past several years demonstrate that the number of intelligence-related writings by present and former CIA employees has steadily increased. This constant flow of information has made available to the public ~~domain~~ an increasingly detailed picture of the CIA in spite of the review procedure ^{PUBLICATIONS} ~~WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED TO REGULATE THAT FLOW.~~ ^{THAT} procedure has not been (and probably cannot be made) perfect, and in spite of the best intentions by all parties concerned, some significant disclosures of classified information have been made. ^{THESE DISCLOSURES HAVE INCLUDED NAMES} ~~This has included~~ the names of CIA personnel, the location or confirmation of the existence of CIA stations and bases abroad, the identification of CIA organizational units at various levels, the covers used (even specific cover slots), operational methods used, internal administrative procedures, foreign liaison relationships, operational targets, the complete story of actual cases, and even the identification of sources. In addition, as vague and minor details accumulate, they take on greater meaning, ^{AND COMES OUT TO} ~~the whole can~~ be greater than the sum of ~~all~~ its parts. The harm these ^{SOMEWHAT} revelations are doing to CIA and the overall U. S. intelligence effort is difficult to assess. ^{APPEARS} It ~~is~~ certain however, that this threat to our national intelligence effort can only grow more serious under the current situation and that there will be a further development of the perception, already widely held, that Americans cannot keep secrets. Even when published accounts are acknowledged to be non-official, repeated confirmation by different authors, each writing on the basis of ^{INTIMATE, PERSONAL} ~~personal~~ knowledge and experience ^{GAINED IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY,} and making this fact very clear in flyleaf sketches, blurs in the public mind the line between official and non-official disclosure. In the ~~more~~ critical areas, which relate directly to an intelligence agency's success, this accumulation of gift information has a chilling effect on

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would-be intelligence sources, offers an unneeded edge to our professional adversaries, and causes consternation among our official friends which only can lead, in the short run, to increasing difficulties for our intelligence efforts and, over the long run, to a significant and serious impairment of our national security. ~~Based on the ill effects from past revelations and the publicly available picture against which new details can be assessed, can we not honestly and reasonably conclude that the release of any additional factual data concerning the CIA will have some degree of harmful effect. If the new revelations do not directly cause harm at least won't they contribute to the harmful perceptions further chilling the atmosphere in which the CIA must operate.~~

2. ~~Everything that relates either directly or indirectly to an intelligence service and its activities is sensitive to some degree. Supportive of this fact is the CIA regulation covering access to, and release of, official information. This regulation defines official information as all information, whether classified or unclassified, that is originated, received, or controlled by the Agency in pursuance of law or in connection with the discharge of official duties. CIA policy is that such information is not to be used for personal use or benefit and may not be copied or removed from the files of the Agency for any purpose except in connection with official business. When people join an organization of this nature, they recognize that they are taking a position of trust and confidentiality. This is formally recognized and reinforced by the signing of a secrecy agreement. Any person who works in any position in an intelligence service is constantly being exposed to sensitive and classified information either by working directly in clandestine activities, by supporting them, or by processing the product from them. This constant, personal, and intimate immersion will so permeate one's experience that it would hardly be possible to write or speak meaningfully about intelligence matters without reference to this knowledge. This association with secrecy becomes a major part of one's experience in the intelligence business and affects us in many ways. To stay in the business one must learn very quickly how to protect the covert side of one's life and the~~

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sensitive information with which one comes into contact. That the great majority recognize this need and successfully abide by it is attested to by the small number fired for security indiscretions. ^{RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THIS REQUIREMENT} ~~Oddly, this need for secrecy~~ ^{BY SOME AS VALID} ~~is seems to be~~ accepted while one works for CIA but somehow is considered to lose its validity when one leaves the Agency, ^{AS THOUGH TERMINATION OF ONE'S EMPLOYMENT ALSO TERMINATES} ~~The often ignored question is whether the information~~ ^{THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THIS SENSITIVE INFORMATION, OR CAUSES THE INFORMATION} ~~absorbed and retained during CIA employment continues to require protection~~ ^{TO LOSE ITS SENSITIVITY BECAUSE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT HAS CEASED.}

25X1


^{CERTAINLY,} ~~And in the field of U.S. foreign relations,~~ ^{IT HAS ~~WAS~~ BEEN} ~~would it not be~~ appropriate to ^{ASSUME THAT} ~~ask whether~~ the public exposures of CIA involvement in restoring the Shah to the throne in Iran played a role in the takeover 26 years later of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the holding of our hostages.]

4 To prevent the compromise of classified information in the writings of present and former Agency employees, the Agency implemented the publications review procedure. The internal guidelines used in review have been sharply drawn so that they will fall well within legal requirements, and in practice they have been meticulously and defensively applied to avoid confrontation and possible legal actions. In the past, some material has been released that we would withhold today under current guidelines, an indication that we have found it necessary to become more restrictive. From those who favor the release of more information we are continually confronted with arguments which are usually reduced to "if you released that, then, you should be able to release this now." Once any release begins, there is constant pressure to release more, ^{AN INCREASINGLY CONCENTRIC AND} ~~in a~~ never-ending cycle. Some authors have reacted maliciously to our deletions by noting them and then ^{REFASHIONING} ~~rewording~~ ^{ALMOST} ~~them in a way~~ ^{STILL WOULD} ~~that tends to compromise~~ ^{NOT ESSENTIALLY BE} ~~but remains outside what is~~ classifiable. ^{THE SENSITIVE INFORMATION}

5 To staunch this flow of sensitive information, it is recommended that CIA adopt a guideline that would withhold in toto all writings by employees and former

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employees that are non-fictional accounts of actual situations and activities conducted by or on behalf of the CIA. This would include accounts of all covert operational activities of an FI, CI, and CA nature as well as those administrative, developmental, and support activities related to them. It would include internal administrative, procedural, and operational methods used to process intelligence information and produce a finished intelligence product. Writings concerned solely with finished intelligence or other types of products normally disseminated by CIA, and scholarly writings concerned with the general situation in the intelligence field or in the intelligence community could be published after appropriate review and approval. Roman-a-clef novels with CIA themes would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and purely fictional writings that vary widely from true accounts will be released. It is suggested that this guideline be implemented by issuing the necessary guidelines to reviewers who will withhold entire manuscripts that fall within the ^{RESTRICTED} ~~above~~ categories. The basis for withholding will normally be to protect intelligence activities, sources, and methods, with finer distinctions possible to protect foreign government information and CIA organizational data.



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5 Aug 1981

Approved For Release 2005/08/24 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001000030051-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Services

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FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: A Suggestion for Handling Certain Manuscripts
Written by Current and Former CIA Employees

1. The statistics over the past several years demonstrate that the number of intelligence-related writings by present and former CIA employees has steadily increased. This constant flow of information has made available to the public domain an increasingly detailed picture of the CIA in spite of the review procedure. That procedure has not been (and probably cannot be made) perfect and in spite of the best intentions by all parties concerned some significant disclosures of classified information have been made. This has included the names of CIA personnel, the location or confirmation of the existence of CIA stations and bases abroad, the identification of CIA organizational units at various levels, the covers used (even specific cover slots), operational methods used, internal administrative procedures, foreign liaison relationships, operational targets, the complete story of actual cases, and even the identification of sources. In addition, as vague and minor details accumulate, they take on greater meaning; i.e., the whole can be greater than the sum of all its parts. The harm these revelations are doing to CIA and the overall U. S. intelligence effort is difficult to assess. It is certain however, that this threat to our national intelligence effort can only grow more serious under the current situation and that there will be a further development of the perception, already widely held, that Americans cannot keep secrets. Even when published accounts are acknowledged to be non-official, repeated confirmation by different authors, each writing on the basis of personal knowledge and experience and making this fact very clear in flyleaf sketches, blurs in the public mind the line between official and non-official disclosure. In the more critical areas, which relate directly to an intelligence agency's success, this accumulation of gift information has a chilling effect on

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would be intelligence sources, offers an unneeded edge to our professional adversaries, and causes consternation among our official friends which only can lead, in the short run, to increasing difficulties for our intelligence efforts and, over the long run, to a significant and serious impairment of our national security. Based on the ill effects from past revelations and the publicly available picture against which new details can be assessed, can we not honestly and reasonably conclude that the release of any additional factual data concerning the CIA will have some degree of harmful effect. If the new revelations do not directly cause harm at least won't they contribute to the harmful perceptions further chilling the atmosphere in which the CIA must operate.

2. Everything that relates either directly or indirectly to an intelligence service and its activities is sensitive to some degree. Supportive of this fact is the CIA regulation covering access to, and release of, official information. This regulation defines official information as all information, whether classified or unclassified, that is originated, received, or controlled by the Agency in pursuance of law or in connection with the discharge of official duties. CIA policy is that such information is not to be used for personal use or benefit and may not be copied or removed from the files of the Agency for any purpose except in connection with official business. When people join an organization of this nature, they recognize that they are taking a position of trust and confidentiality. This is formally recognized and reinforced by the signing of a secrecy agreement. Any person who works in any position in an intelligence service is constantly being exposed to sensitive and classified information either by working directly in clandestine activities, by supporting them, or by processing the product from them. This constant, personal, and intimate immersion will so permeate one's experience that it would hardly be possible to write or speak meaningfully about intelligence matters without reference to this knowledge. This association with secrecy becomes a major part of one's experience in the intelligence business and affects us in many ways. To stay in the business one must learn very quickly how to

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sensitive information with which one comes into contact. That the great majority recognize this need and successfully abide by it is attested to by the small number fired for security indiscretions. Oddly, this need for secrecy is accepted while one works for CIA but somehow is considered to lose its validity when one leaves the Agency. The often ignored question is whether the information absorbed and retained during CIA employment continues to require protection when one leaves. That the sensitivity of intelligence information can last for long periods has been proven by the negative reactions of friendly liaison services to disclosures of joint activities dating even to WW II. Regarding human agents, a consensus of intelligence officers today of the length of time normally required to protect such a source, which would include the immediate family, would probably be about 75 years. And in the field of U.S. foreign relations, would it not be appropriate to ask whether the public exposures of CIA involvement in restoring the Shah to the throne in Iran played a role in the takeover 26 years later of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the holding of our hostages.

3. To prevent the compromise of classified information in the writings of present and former Agency employees, the Agency implemented the publications review procedure. The internal guidelines used in review have been sharply drawn so that they will fall well within legal requirements, and in practice they have been meticulously and defensively applied to avoid confrontation and possible legal actions. In the past, some material has been released that we would withhold today under current guidelines, an indication that we have found it necessary to become more restrictive. From those who favor the release of more information we are continually confronted with arguments which are usually reduced to "if you released that, then you should be able to release this now." Once any release begins, there is constant pressure to release more in a never-ending cycle. Some authors have reacted maliciously to our deletions by noting them and then rewording them in a way that tends to compromise but remains outside what is classifiable.

4. To staunch this flow of sensitive information, it is recommended that CIA adopt a guideline that would withhold in toto all information by employees and former

employees that are non-fictional accounts of actual situations and activities conducted by or on behalf of the CIA. This would include accounts of all covert operational activities of an FI, CI, and CA nature as well as those administrative, developmental, and support activities related to them. It would include internal administrative, procedural, and operational methods used to process intelligence information and produce a finished intelligence product. Writings concerned solely with finished intelligence or other types of products normally disseminated by CIA, and scholarly writings concerned with the general situation in the intelligence field or in the intelligence community could be published after appropriate review and approval. Roman a clef novels with CIA themes would be reviewed on a case by case basis and purely fictional writings that vary widely from true accounts will be released. It is suggested that this guideline be implemented by issuing the necessary guidelines to reviewers who will withhold entire manuscripts that fall within the above categories. The basis for withholding will normally be to protect intelligence activities, sources, and methods, with finer distinctions possible to protect foreign government information and CIA organizational data.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Services

STAT FROM:

Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: A Suggestion for Handling Certain Manuscripts
Written by Current and Former CIA Employees

1. The statistics over the past several years demonstrate that the number of intelligence-related writings by present and former CIA employees has steadily increased. This constant flow of information has made available to the public domain an increasingly detailed picture of the CIA. *in spite of the review procedure, that* The review procedure has not been (and probably cannot be made) perfect and in spite of the best intentions by all parties concerned some significant disclosures of classified information have been made. This has included the names of CIA personnel, the location or confirmation of the existence of CIA stations and bases abroad, the identification of CIA organizational units at various levels, the covers used (even specific cover slots), operational methods used, internal administrative procedures, foreign liaison relationships, operational targets, the complete story of actual cases, and even the identification of sources. In addition, as vague and minor details accumulate, they take on greater meaning; i.e., the whole *can be* greater than the sum of all its parts. The harm these revelations are doing to CIA and the overall U. S. intelligence effort *is difficult to assess.* *however,* ~~can only be guessed.~~ ~~nevertheless,~~ that this threat to our national intelligence effort can only grow more serious *and under the current situation and* that there will be a further development of the perception, already widely held, that Americans cannot keep secrets. Even when published accounts are acknowledged to be non-official, repeated confirmation by different authors, each writing on the basis of personal knowledge and experience and making this fact very clear in ~~the book's~~ *sketches* flyleaf ~~bio sketch,~~ blurs the line between official and non-official disclosure *in the public mind*. In the *more* critical areas, *which relate directly* ~~this accumulation of~~ *to an intelligence agency's success, this accumulation of* gift information will have a chilling effect on ~~potential~~ *has* intelligence sources *would be*.

~~and~~ offers an unneeded edge to our professional adversaries, and causes consternation among our official friends which ~~can~~ ^{can} only lead, in the short run, to increasing difficulties for our intelligence efforts and, over the long run, to ~~the~~ ^a significant and serious impairment of our national security.

2. Everything that relates either directly or indirectly to an intelligence service is sensitive ~~and requires a degree of protection.~~ ^{to some} There is ~~essentially nothing about an intelligence service that totally lacks sensitivity,~~ that does not form part of a ~~thread~~ ^{covert} in a fabric of ever greater ~~sensitivity.~~ ^{secrecy.} Supportive of this fact is the CIA regulation covering access to, and release of, official information. This regulation defines official information as all information, whether classified or unclassified, that is originated, received, or controlled by the Agency in pursuance of law or in connection with the discharge of official duties. ~~The~~ CIA policy is that such information is not to be used for personal use or benefit and may not be copied or removed from the files of the Agency for any purpose except in connection with official business. When people join an organization of this nature, they recognize that they are taking a position of trust and confidentiality. This is formally recognized and reinforced by the signing of a secrecy agreement. Once inside the organization, each person will be exposed ~~to~~ ^{is} through many avenues both direct and indirect ~~to a covert mechanism which makes clandestine efforts to collect intelligence and counterintelligence information, processes that information into finished intelligence, and sometimes takes covert actions,~~ ^{to a covert mechanism which makes clandestine efforts to collect intelligence and counterintelligence information, processes that information into finished intelligence, and sometimes takes covert actions,} and will be associated routinely and continuously with people, activities, and facilities that require secrecy to succeed. This association with secrecy becomes a major part of one's experience in the intelligence business, and to stay

in the business one must learn very quickly how to protect ~~sensitive information.~~ ^{the covert side of one's}

~~life and the sensitive information with which one comes into contact~~ That the great majority succeed in this effort is attested to by the small number

fired for security indiscretions. Oddly, this need for secrecy is accepted while

one works for CIA but somehow ~~that need is seen as losing~~ ^{loses} its validity when one

leaves the Agency. That the sensitivity of such information can last long periods

has been proven by the negative reactions of friendly liaison services to disclosures made many years after the fact.

The often ignored question is whether the information absorbed and obtained during CIA employment continues to retain its sensitivity.

3. To prevent the compromise of classified information in the writings of present and former Agency employees, the Agency ~~has~~ ^{used in review} implemented the publications review procedure. ^{The} ~~The~~ internal guidelines ~~established to govern these reviews~~ have been sharply drawn so that they will fall well within legal requirements, and in practice they have been meticulously and defensively applied to avoid confrontation and possible legal actions. In the past, some material has been released that we would withhold today under current guidelines, an indication that we have found it necessary to ^{become} ~~be~~ more restrictive ~~in what is released~~. From those who favor the release of more information we are continually confronted with arguments which are usually reduced to "if you released that, then, you should be able to release this now." Once any release begins, there is constant pressure to release more in a never-ending cycle. Some authors have reacted maliciously to our deletions by ^{noting them and then rewording them in a way that tends} ~~rewording them in a way that provides essentially the same meaning~~ ^{to compromise but remains outside what is classifiable.} ~~but just skirts classifiability~~.

4. To staunch this flow of sensitive information, it is recommended that CIA ^{guideline that would withhold} ~~adopt a policy of generally withholding in toto~~ all writings by employees and former employees that are non-fictional accounts of actual situations and activities conducted by or on behalf of the CIA. This would include accounts of all covert operational activities of an FI, CI, and CA nature as well as ^{those} ~~as~~ administrative, developmental, and support activities related to them. It would ~~also~~ include internal administrative, ^{procedural,} and operational methods used to process intelligence information and produce a finished intelligence product. Writings concerned solely with finished intelligence or other types of products normally disseminated by CIA, and scholarly writings concerned with the general situation in the intelligence field or in the intelligence community ^{could} ~~may~~ be published after appropriate review ^{and approval.} ~~Roman a clef~~ novels with CIA themes would be reviewed on a case by case basis and purely fictional ^{writings} ~~accounts~~ that vary widely from true accounts will be released. It is suggested that this ^{guidance} ~~policy~~ be implemented by issuing the necessary guidelines to reviewers who will withhold entire manuscripts that ^{fall within the above categories.} ~~contain factual accounts of activities.~~

The ~~reason~~ for withholding will normally be to protect intelligence activities, sources, and methods, with finer distinctions possible to protect foreign government information and CIA organizational data.



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Approved For Release 2005/08/24 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001

28 July 1981

FROM:

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Certain

SUBJECT: A Suggested Policy for Handling Manuscripts
Written by Current and Former CIA Employees

1. The statistics over the past several years demonstrate that the number of intelligence-related writings by present and former CIA employees has steadily increased. This constant ~~and ever increasing~~ ^{an increasingly} flow of information has made available to the public domain a ~~continually more~~ detailed picture of the CIA. The review procedure has not been (and probably cannot be made) perfect and in spite of the best intentions by all parties concerned some significant disclosures of classified information have been made. This has included the names of CIA personnel, the location or confirmation of the existence of CIA stations and bases abroad, the identification of CIA organizational units at various levels, the covers used (even specific cover slots), operational methods used, internal administrative procedures, foreign liaison relationships, operational targets, the complete story of actual cases, and even the identification of sources. In addition, as vague and minor details accumulate, they take on greater meaning; i.e., the whole is greater than the sum of all its parts. ~~How many parts of a~~ ^{people} ~~house spread on the ground would one~~ ^{books} ~~have to study until they realized they were~~ ^{BLURS} ~~looking at an unassembled building.~~ The harm these revelations are doing to CIA and the overall U. S. intelligence effort can only be guessed. ~~It is certain,~~ nevertheless, that this threat to our national intelligence effort can only grow more serious and that there will be a further development of the perception, already widely held, that Americans cannot keep secrets. Even when published accounts are acknowledged to be non-official, repeated confirmation by different authors, each writing on the basis of personal knowledge and experience, and making this fact very clear in the flyleaf bio sketch, the line between official and non-official disclosure ~~becomes blurred~~ in the public mind. In the most

critical areas. This accumulation of gift information creates an un-

and non-official disclosure becomes blurred in the public mind. In the most critical areas, this accumulation of gift information offers an *unneeded edge* effect on potential intelligence sources and offers an *unneeded*

edge to our professional adversaries and causes consternation among our official friends which can only lead to increasing difficulties for our intelligence efforts and, ^{IN THE SHORT RUN,} ~~will~~, over the long run, ^{THE} ~~lead eventually~~ to significant ^{MENT OF} and serious ~~impairing~~ our national security.

2. Everything that relates either directly or indirectly to an intelligence service is sensitive and requires a degree of protection. There is essentially nothing about an intelligence service that totally lacks sensitivity, that does not form part of a thread in a fabric of ever greater sensitivity.

~~To support this view one need only to look at the CIA regulation covering~~ ^{SUPPORTIVE OF THIS FACT IS} access to, and release of, official information. ^{THIS} ~~regulation~~ defines official information as all information, whether classified or unclassified, that is originated, received, or controlled by the Agency in pursuance of law or in connection with the discharge of official duties. ^{The CIA policy is that such} ~~information is not to be used for personal use or benefit and may not be copied or removed from the files of the Agency for any purpose except in connection with official business.~~

When people join an organization of this nature, they recognize that they are taking a position of trust and confidentiality. This is formally recognized and re-inforced by the signing of a secrecy agreement. Once inside the organization, each person will be exposed either directly or indirectly to classified work and will be associated routinely and continuously with people, activities, and facilities that require secrecy to succeed. This association with secrecy becomes a major part of one's experience in the intelligence business, and to stay in the business one must ^{EFFORT} ~~very quickly~~ learn how to protect sensitive information. That the great majority succeed in this ^{ODDLY,} ~~is~~ attested to by the small number fired for security indiscretions. [^] This need for secrecy is accepted while one works for

CIA but somehow that need is seen as losing its validity when one leaves the Agency. ^{the sensitivity of such information can last long periods} That this is not the case has been proven by the negative reactions of friendly liaison services. ^{negatively} ~~A case can also be made that U.S. foreign relations have been affected in at least minor but hard-to-measure ways; and that the willingness has cooled of people who could be potential sources or collaborators of the U.S. intelligence effort.~~ ^{publication of information}

3. To prevent the compromise of classified information in the writings of present and former Agency employees, the Agency has implemented the publications review procedure. The internal guidelines established to govern these reviews have been sharply drawn so that they will fall well within legal requirements, and in practice they have been meticulously and defensively applied to avoid confrontation and possible legal actions. In the past, some material has been released

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we have found it necessary to be more restrictive in what is released,
that the ~~situation~~ requires some remedy. From those who favor the release of

more information we are continually confronted with arguments which are usually
reduced to "if you released that ^{then,} you should be able to release this ^{now}." Once any

release begins, there is constant pressure to release more in a never-ending

cycle. Some authors *have reacted maliciously to our deletions*
~~when asked to delete a portion of their manuscript, have reacted~~
by rewording them in a way that provides essentially
~~rewritten that section by explaining that the original material was deleted at~~
the same meaning but just skirts classifiability.
~~CIA's request and then they proceed to rewrite the section in a way that undermines~~

~~our efforts to protect classified information.~~

4. To ~~stop~~ ^{STAGNANT} this ^{SENSITIVE} ~~situation~~ ^{FLOW OF INFORMATION,}, it is recommended that CIA adopt a policy of

generally withholding in toto all writings by employees and former employees

that are non-fictional accounts of actual situation and activities conducted by
or on behalf of the CIA. ~~and remove a class of novels with CIA themes~~

This would include accounts of all covert operational
activities of an FI, CI, and CA nature as well as ^{administrative,} developmental, and support
activities related to them. It would also include internal administrative and
operational methods used to process intelligence information and produce a
finished intelligence product. Writings concerned solely with finished intelli-
gence or other types of products normally disseminated by CIA, and scholarly
writings concerned with the general situation in the intelligence field or in
the intelligence community may be published after appropriate review. It is

suggested that this policy be implemented by issuing the necessary guidelines to
reviewers who will withhold entire manuscripts that ^{CONTAIN FACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF ACTIVITIES,} ~~meet the above definition:~~

The reason for withholding will normally be to protect intelligence activities,
sources, and methods, with finer distinctions possible to protect foreign govern-
ment information and CIA organizational data.

*Roman a clef novels with CIA themes would be
reviewed on a case by case basis and purely
fictional accounts that vary widely from true
accounts will be released.*

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~~where ~~the~~ an intel org~~
which relate directly to an
intel agency's functions,

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>Don</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>The final draft incorporating suggestions from CRD people.</i></p> <p><i>STAN!</i></p> <p><i>HAVE READ THRU THIS SEVERAL TIMES. CAN'T HELP BUT FEEL THAT THIS COULD STAND TIGHTENING. NOTE MY EDITORIALS, COMMENTS, ETC.</i></p> <p><i>Don</i></p>		
FROM: <i>Stan K</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)